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Abstract The delimitation of maritime areas between neighbours is of vital impor-
tance in that it provides for stable and long-lasting relations. With the maritime
boundary delimitation, international law has been enriched with a new chapter that
has developed steadily in proportion with the related challenges and expectations.
After nearly a century of practice, international courts and tribunals achieve a very
useful result in boundary delimitation: a single maritime boundary employing the now
well-established three-stage equidistance-relevant-circumstances method. The paper
examines the Wade-mecuum of the move and the emergence of jurisprudence
addressing delimitation of a State’s maritime entitlements located beyond 200 nautical
miles from the baselines, i.e., the so-called Outer Continental Shelf and the legal
regime thereof.
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1 Introduction
With maritime delimitation, international law has been enriched with a
new chapter that has developed rapidly in proportion with the related
challenges and expectations. The delimitation of maritime areas
between neighbours is of vital importance in that it provides for
stable and long-lasting relations.
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Many maritime boundaries in the world are, however, not delimited.
The total number of potential maritime boundaries is 420,1 yet there are
only about 200 boundary agreements to date. This implies that disputes
relating to maritime delimitation have many days ahead of them. To
settle such disputes, States shall have to negotiate among themselves or
use available dispute resolution mechanisms.
Customary law, developed progressively through conferences on
codification and bilateral boundary agreements, appears a priori as an
important source for maritime boundary delimitation law.
Proceedings of the UN International Law Commission led to the 1958
Geneva Conventions on the delimitation of the territorial sea and the
continental shelf. The third United Nations Conference on the Law of the
Sea gave rise to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
(UNCLOS) of 10 December 1982. The latter provides for the delimitation
of the territorial sea, the continental shelf and the economic exclusive
zone. However,2 a review of maritime delimitation disputes reveals that
these provisions hardly occupy the central place they are expected to.
Moreover, bilateral boundary agreements have not produced adequate
practice of the law to be able to impose itself as customary law.
The fundamental role in the formulation of legal rules and principles
that should govern the law on maritime delimitation therefore appears
to be the responsibility of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and
arbitrary tribunals. The tribunals apply the delimitation rules as
indicated by the Court while occasionally introducing some innova-
tions, which are later adopted by the ICJ in a spirit of mutual benefit. It
is worth noting at this point that the International Tribunal for the Law
of the Sea (ITLOS) was first seized of a maritime delimitation case with
the presentation of the case on the dispute regarding the maritime
boundary between Bangladesh and Myanmar in the Bay of Bengal on 14
December 2009.3
1 The US Dept of State, Bureau of Oceans and International Environment and Scientific Affairs, Limits in the
Seas, No: 108, 1st Rev (Maritime Boundaries of the World, 1990).
2 It may be recalled that in the North Sea Continental Shelf (Germany v Denmark) Merits, Judgment [1969]
ICJ Rep 3, the ICJ refused to apply the provisions of Article 6 of the 1958 Geneva Convention on the
continental shelf as a rule of customary law. It hence focused on defining the legal principles that should
govern the delimitation of the continental shelf between the two States. It nonetheless had a more marked
attitude in the maritime delimitation case in the region located between Greenland and Jan Mayen (Denmark
v Norway) [1993] ICJ Rep 61 [51]: ‘For the delimitation of the continental shelf … even if customary law on
the continental shelf was to be applied instead of Article 6 of the 1958 Convention as developed in the
jurisprudence’. There is the impression that customary law was hence ousted in favour of maritime
delimitation law.
3 Proceedings instituted in the dispute concerning the maritime boundary between Bangladesh and Myanmar in the
Bay of Bengal, ITLOS/Press 140 (16 December 2009).
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International courts aided in developing what can now be referred to
as maritime delimitation law, which we will endeavour to present in the
form of an instruction manual or a notice on handling a maritime
delimitation case. We will examine the applicable law (2), delimitation
principles (3) and then the delimitation of the maritime border (4). We
will lastly study the consequences of the delimitation method on the
spatial distribution of State jurisdictions with respect to their rights and
obligations including in the grey area (5).
2 The applicable law
The review commences with the presentation of the overall geographical
setting; in other words, the maritime area within which delimitation should
be determined; this area can be illustrated on a map.4 The judge may then
recall the origin and evolution of the dispute, as indicated on the documents
presented by the parties,5 prior to addressing the applicable law.
It is developed out of international custom and treaties, for instance,
the Conventions on the law of the sea concluded in Geneva (Geneva
Conventions) on 29 April 1958 and the UNCLOS on 10 December 1982.
Articles 15, 74 and 83 of the UNCLOS relate, respectively, to the
delimitation of the territorial sea, the EEZ and the continental shelf.6
The review of the jurisdiction clause, regardless of whether it is an
arbitration clause or the application itself, allows the judge to determine the
conditions of referral to the court and verify if these were met at the time
the documents instituting the proceedings were submitted, thereby
authorizing the judge to be seized of the case.
4 See, for example, Maritime delimitation in the Black Sea (Romania v Ukraine) Judgment [2009] ICJ Rep 69.
5 See, Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary between Guinea and Guinea-Bissau, 19 RIAA 149–196 (14
February 1985) [18, 24].
6 Article 15 of the Convention stipulates: Where the coasts of two States are opposite or adjacent to each other,
neither of the two States is entitled, failing agreement between them to the contrary, to extend its territorial sea
beyond the median line every point of which is equidistant from the nearest points on the baselines from which the
breadth of the territorial seas of each of the two States is measured. The above provision does not apply, however,
where it is necessary by reason of historic title or other special circumstances to delimit the territorial seas of the
two States in a way which is at variance therewith. Articles 74 and 83 of the Convention are similarly worded and
provide that: (1) The delimitation of the exclusive economic zone [continental shelf] between States with opposite
or adjacent coasts shall be effected by agreement on the basis of international law, as referred to in Article 38 of the
Statute of the International Court of Justice, in order to achieve an equitable solution. (2) If no agreement can be
reached within a reasonable period of time, the States concerned shall resort to the procedures provided for in Part
XV. (3) Pending agreement as provided for in paragraph 1, the States concerned, in a spirit of understanding and
cooperation, shall make every effort to enter into provisional arrangements of a practical nature and, during this
transitional period, not to jeopardize or hamper the reaching of the final agreement. Such arrangements shall be
without prejudice to the final delimitation. (4) Where there is an agreement in force between the States concerned,
questions relating to the delimitation of the exclusive economic zone [continental shelf] shall be determined in
accordance with the provisions of that agreement. The UNCLOS, 1833 UNTS 3 (1982).
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3 Principles of delimitation
The maritime delimitation that the judge will carry out shall rely on the
determination of the relevant coasts and the relevant maritime zones of
each party.
3.1 The relevant coasts
Relevant coasts are crucial in the delimitation exercise. They are the
basis of a State’s entitlement to the areas to be delimited. As indicated
by the ICJ, the title of a State to the continental shelf and to the EEZ is
based on the principle that the land dominates the sea through the
projection of the coasts or the coastal fronts.7 The land is the legal
source of the power which a State may exercise over territorial
extensions to seaward.8 Moreover, the coast of the territory of the State
is the decisive factor for title to submarine areas adjacent to it.9 It is
therefore important to determine the relevant coasts of each party to
the case, which confer legal entitlement of countries to the continental
shelf and the EEZ, i.e., those whose projections overlap, because the
purpose of delimitation is to resolve the issue of overlapping claims by
drawing a line of separation between the maritime areas concerned.
As explained by the ICJ,10 the role of relevant coasts can have two
different though closely related legal aspects in relation to the
delimitation of the continental shelf and the EEZ. First, it is necessary
to identify the relevant coasts in order to determine what constitutes in
the specific context of a case the overlapping claims to these zones.
Second, the relevant coasts need to be ascertained in order to check, in
the third and final stage of the delimitation process, whether any
7 Maritime delimitation in the Black Sea, supra note 4, 89 [77].
8 North Sea Continental Shelf Case [1969] ICJ Rep 51 [96].
9 See the subject matter of delimitation disputes are indeed many: in the Grisbadarna Case (Norway v
Sweden) [1909] 11 RAA 147 ff, the arbitral award of 14 March 1908 stipulates: ‘Article 3: The Arbitral
Tribunal shall decide whether the boundary line should be considered, either wholly or in part, as fixed by
the Boundary Treaty of 1661 with the map annexed thereto, and in what manner the line thus established
should be drawn; that in so far as the boundary line shall not be considered as fixed by that Treaty and map,
the Tribunal shall determine the boundary line’; first, the outstanding dispute between the two Emirates of
Dubai and Sharjah concerning the demarcation of the boundaries between them shall be referred to
arbitration in the Continental Shelf Case (Tunisia/Libya) [1982] ICJ Rep 18 ff article one of the special
agreement of 10 June 1977 stipulates: ‘The Court is requested to render its judgement in the following
matter: What principles and rules of international law may be applied for the delimitation of the area of the
continental shelf appertaining to the Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya and to the area of the
continental shelf appertaining to the Republic of Tunisia and the Court shall take its decision according to
equitable principles and the relevant circumstances which characterize the area as well as the new accepted
trends in the Third Conference on the Law of the Sea.’
10 Romania v Ukraine, supra note 4, 89 [78].
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disproportionality exists in the ratios of the coastal length of each State
and the maritime areas falling either side of the delimitation line.11 Any
part of the coast of one Party which, because of its geographic situation,
cannot overlap with the extension of the coast of the other is to be
excluded from further consideration by the Court.12 After ascertaining
the relevant coasts of each party, the judge establishes the ratio between
the lengths of the respective coasts of each State and then verifies if
there is any disproportionality between the ratio of the lengths of the
coasts of each party and that of maritime areas on either side of the
delimitation line.13
3.2 The relevant maritime zone
Seaward projections of relevant coasts of the coastal State and the
encroachment effect of these projections on those at sea of the other
coastal State determine maritime delimitation. This means therefore
that the delimitation exercise only takes into account coasts that
generate overlapping titles. It is for this reason that the utility of the
11 North Sea Continental Shelf Case, supra note 8, 51 [96].
12 Tunisia v Libya, supra note 9, [1982] ICJ Rep 61 [75].
13 The ICJ has often faced difficulties to determine relevant coasts. In the Case Concerning the Continental
Shelf (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v Nalta) [1985] ICJ Rep [74] states: ‘In the view of the Court, there is no reason
of principle why the test of proportionality, more or less in the form in which it was used in the Tunisia/
Libya case, namely the identification of ‘‘relevant coasts’’, the identification of ‘‘relevant areas’’ of continental
shelf, the calculation of the mathematical ratios of the lengths of the coasts and the areas of shelf attributed,
and finally the comparison of such ratios, should not be employed to verify the equity of a delimitation
between opposite coasts, just as well as between adjacent coasts. However, there may well in such a case be
practical difficulties which render it inappropriate in that form. These difficulties are particularly evident in
the present case where, in the first place, the geographical context is such that the identification of the
relevant coasts and the relevant areas is so much at large that virtually any variant could be chosen, leading
to widely different results, and in the second place the area to which the judgment will in fact apply is
limited by reason of the existence of claims of third States. To apply the proportionality test simply to the
areas within these limits would be unrealistic; ….’ However, the primacy of coastal geography in terms of
delimitation is settled jurisprudence: ‘It is … necessary to examine closely the geographical configuration of
the coastlines of the countries whose continental shelves are to be delimited’ North Sea Case, supra note 1,
[1969] ICJ Rep [96]; ‘…the method of delimitation which it adopts for the Atlantic region must be one that
has relation to the coasts of the Parties actually abutting on the continental shelf of that region.’ ‘’The coast
of each of the Parties … constitutes the starting line from which one has to set out in order to ascertain how
far the submarine areas appertaining to each of them extend in a seaward direction, as well as in relation to
neighbouring States situated either in an adjacent or opposite position,’ Tunisia v. Libya, supra note 9, [1982]
ICJ Rep [74]; ‘The delimitation line to be drawn in a given area will depend upon the coastal configuration,’
Gulf of Maine case. In the case concerning the Gulf of Maine area (Canada v United States of America) [1984]
ICJ Rep 246 ff, the special agreement of 29 March 1979 stipulates in its article 2: the Chamber is requested to
decide, in accordance with the principles and rules of international law applicable in the matter as between
the Parties, the following question: What is the course of the single maritime boundary that divides the
continental shelf and fisheries zones of Canada and the United States of America […]. 2) The Chamber is
requested to describe the course of the maritime boundary in terms of geodetic lines connecting geographic
coordinates of points. The Chamber is also requested for illustrative purposes only to depict the course of
the boundary on … chart … [1984] ICJ Rep [205].
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notion of relevant maritime zone is often challenged. The ICJ14 sought
to justify the use of this notion. It observed that the legal concept of the
‘‘relevant area’’ has to be taken into account as part of the methodology
of maritime delimitation.
In the first place, depending on the configuration of the relevant coasts
in the general geographical context and the methods for the construction
of their seaward projections, the relevant area may include certain
maritime spaces and exclude others which are not germane to the case in
hand. Secondly, the relevant area is pertinent to checking disproportion-
ality. This will be done as the final phase of the methodology. The
purpose of delimitation is not to apportion equal shares of the area or
indeed proportional shares. The test of disproportionality is not in itself a
method of delimitation. It is rather a means of checking whether the
delimitation line arrived at by other means needs adjustment because of a
significant disproportionality in the ratios between the maritime areas
which would fall to one party or other by virtue of the delimitation line
arrived at by other means, and the lengths of their respective coasts.
The Court further observes that15 for the purposes of this final
exercise in the delimitation process the calculation of the relevant area
does not purport to be precise and is approximate. The object of
delimitation is to achieve a delimitation that is equitable, not an equal
apportionment of maritime areas.16
The relevant maritime zone covers the entire area of coastal
extensions of litigating States. These projections may overlap those of
third-party States.17
After establishing the relevant maritime zone, the judge will then
proceed with the maritime delimitation requested by the litigating
14 Romania v Ukraine, supra note 4, 99 [110].
15 Ibid [111].
16 Germany v Denmark, supra note 2, 21–22 [18], the Court states: ‘[…] having regard both to the language
of the Special Agreements and to more general considerations of law relating to the regime of the continental
shelf, its task in the present proceedings relates essentially to the delimitation and not the apportionment of the
areas concerned, or their division into converging sectors. Delimitation is a process which involves establishing
the boundaries of an area already, in principle, appertaining to the coastal State and not the determination de
novo of such an area. Delimitation in an equitable manner is one thing, but not the same thing as awarding a
just and equitable share of a previously undelimited area, even though in a number of cases the results may be
comparable, or even identical.’ In the delimitation case (Greenland v Jan Mayen), supra note 2, [64], the Court
states: ‘[…] Thus the law does not require a delimitation based upon an endeavour to share out an area of
overlap on the basis of comparative figures for the length of the coastal fronts and the areas generated by them.
The task of a tribunal is to define the boundary line between the areas under the maritime jurisdiction of two
States; the sharing-out of the area is therefore the consequence of the delimitation, not vice versa.’
17 Romania v Ukraine, supra note 4, 100 [112], the Court notes that the delimitation will occur within the
enclosed Black Sea, with Romania being both adjacent to, and opposite Ukraine, and with Bulgaria and
Turkey lying to the south. It will stay north of any area where third-party interests could become involved.
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parties. To this end, he shall make use of the applicable rules on
delimitation that emerge from the jurisprudence in the absence of rules
in the UNCLOS.
4 Delimitation of the maritime boundary
4.1 The method of delimitation
It is outlined by the ICJ18 in the Case Concerning the Continental shelf
(Libya/Malta) in which it states: ‘In applying the equitable principles
thus elicited, within the limits defined above, and in the light of the
relevant circumstances, the Court intends to proceed by stages; thus, it
will first make a provisional delimitation by using a criterion and a
method both of which are clearly destined to play an important role in
producing the final result; it will then examine this provisional solution
in the light of the requirements derived from other criteria, which may
call for a correction of this initial result.’
The provisional delimitation line is determined, using methods that are
geometrically objective and also appropriate for the geography of the area
in which the delimitation is to take place. So far as delimitation between
adjacent coasts is concerned, an equidistance line will be drawn unless there
are compelling reasons that make this unfeasible in the particular case.19 So
far as opposite coasts are concerned, the provisional delimitation line will
consist of a median line between the two coasts. No legal consequences
flow from the use of the terms ‘‘median line’’ and ‘‘equidistance line’’ since
the method of delimitation is the same for both.20
Equidistance and median lines are to be constructed from the most
appropriate points on the coasts of the two States concerned, with
particular attention being paid to those protuberant coastal points
situated nearest to the area to the delimited.
The Court considers therefore the extent to which the Court may,
when constructing a single-purpose delimitation line, deviate from the
base points selected by the Parties for their territorial seas. When
construction of a provisional equidistance line between adjacent States
18 Libya v Malta, supra note 13, 46 [60].
19 Case Concerning the Territorial and Maritime Dispute in the Caribbean Sea (Nicaragua v Honduras), [2007]
ICJ Rep 745 [281], it is stated: ‘…, the Court finds itself within the exception provided for in Article 15 of
UNCLOS, namely facing special circumstances in which it cannot apply the equidistance principle. At the
same time equidistance remains the general rule.’
20 This is stated by the ICJ in the aforementioned Black Sea Case, supra note 4, 101 [116].
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is called for, the Court will have in mind considerations relating to both
Parties’ coastlines when choosing its own base points for this purpose.
The line thus adopted is heavily dependent on the physical geography
and the most seaward points of the two coasts. In keeping with its
settled jurisprudence on maritime delimitation, the first stage of the
Court’s approach is to establish the provisional equidistance line. At this
stage, the judge pays no heed to any relevant circumstances, and the
line is drawn in accordance with strictly geometric criteria on the basis
of objective data.21
Based on the coastal configuration of litigating States, the provisional
line may vary: an equidistance line between adjacent coasts and a
median line between opposite coasts, for example. Given that the
course of the final line should result in an equitable solution,22 the
Court will at the second stage consider whether there are factors calling
for the adjustment or shifting of the provisional equidistance line in
order to achieve an equitable result.23 This is the second part of the
delimitation exercise to which the Court will turn, having first
established the provisional equidistance line.
In the third stage, the Court will verify that the line does not, as it
stands, lead to an inequitable result by reason of any marked
disproportion between the ratio of the respective coastal lengths and
the ratio between the relevant maritime area of each State by reference
to the delimitation line. A final check for an equitable outcome entails a
confirmation that no great disproportionality of maritime areas is
evident by comparison to the ratio of coastal lengths.24
21 Ibid 101 [118].
22 In compliance with the first paragraphs of Articles 74 and 83 of the UNCLOS.
23 Case Concerning the Land and Maritime Boundary (Cameroon and Nigeria, Equatorial Guinea
intervening) [2002] ICJ Rep \http://www.icjcij.org/docket/files/94/7453.pdf[. On 29 March 1994, the
Government of Cameroon filed an application in the Registry of the ICJ in which it observed that ‘de-
limitation [of the maritime boundary between the two States] has remained a partial one and, despite many
attempts to complete it, the two parties have been unable to do so.’ It consequently requested the court, ‘In
order to avoid further incidents between the two countries, […] to determine the course of the maritime
boundary between the two States beyond the line fixed in 1975.’ In the Case between Cameroon and Nigeria,
the ICJ states in [288]: ‘The Court has on various occasions made it clear what the applicable criteria,
principles and rules of delimitation are when a line covering several zones of coincident jurisdictions is to be
determined. They are expressed in the so-called equitable principles/relevant circumstances method. This
method, which is very similar to the equidistance/special circumstances method applicable in delimitation of
the territorial sea, involves first drawing an equidistance line, then considering whether there are factors
calling for the adjustment or shifting of that line in order to achieve an ‘‘equitable result.’’’ See also the
aforementioned case Nicaragua v Honduras, supra note 19, 741 [271].
24 Romania v Ukraine, supra note 4, 103 [122]: ‘This is not to suggest that these respective areas should be
proportionate to coastal lengths: as the Court has said ‘‘the sharing out of the area is therefore the
consequence of the delimitation, not vice versa’’. Maritime Delimitation in the Area between Greenland and Jan
Mayen (Denmark v Norway), Judgment, [1993] ICJ Rep 67 [64].
500 Tafsir Malick Ndiaye
123
4.2 The provisional equidistance line
This includes two key stages: selection of base points and consequently
the construction of the line itself. The geography of the area to be
delimited plays an important role in the selection of base points. The
judge will therefore always describe the general geographical context
when called upon to carry out maritime delimitation.
In the case of the Black Sea delimitation, the Court had to indicate the
conclusions drawn from the fact that the dispute related to both
adjacent and opposite coasts. The Court will identify the appropriate
points on the Parties’ relevant coast or coasts which mark a significant
change in the direction of the coast, in such a way that the geometrical
figure formed by the line connecting all these points reflects the general
direction of the coastlines. The points thus selected on each coast will
have an effect on the provisional equidistance line that takes due
account of the geography.25
According to the Court,26 the geography shows that the capacity of
the coasts to generate overlapping titles indicates the existence of two
areas: in one case, the coasts are adjacent; in the other, they are
opposite. In practice, the first conclusion which the Court draws from
this is that, on the Romanian coast, the significant base points from
which the equidistance line and the median line must be established are
the same, since this coast is both adjacent and opposite to the Ukrainian
coast. The second conclusion is that, as the Ukrainian coast consists of
two portions—one adjacent to the Romanian coast, the other opposite
to it—the base points to take into account must be defined separately,
according to whether the adjacent or opposite portion is concerned.
The third conclusion is the identification of a turning-point on the
equidistance line where the effects of adjacency give way to those of the
coasts on the opposite side, resulting in a change in the direction of the
line. Lastly, the Court will need to consider the relevance or otherwise
of Serpents’ Island in terms of the choice of base points.
After describing the views of Parties on base points to be taken into
consideration in order to draw the provisional equidistance line
between adjacent coasts of the two parties, the Court examined the
question of whether the base points to be used could be the same as
those selected by each State to determine the outer limit of its territorial
25 Ibid, 105 [127].
26 Ibid [128].
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sea. In this respect, the Court observed27 that the geometrical nature of
the first stage of the delimitation exercise leads it to use as base points
those which the geography of the coast identifies as a physical reality at
the time of the delimitation. That geographical reality covers not only
the physical elements produced by geodynamics and the movements of
the sea, but also any other material factors that are present.
The Court upholds the dual principle of baselines and base points. It
appears that the base points and baselines for the purpose of
delimitation are independent of those that serve to measure the
breadth of the territorial sea and other maritime jurisdictions. The
Court28 observes that the issue of determining the baseline for the
purpose of measuring the breadth of the continental shelf and the EEZ
and the issue of identifying base points for drawing an equidis-
tance/median line for the purpose of delimiting the continental shelf
and the EEZ between adjacent/opposite States are two different issues.
In the first case, the coastal State may determine the relevant base
points in compliance with provisions of the UNCLOS.29 This is,
however, an exercise that always has a point of international
relevance.30 In the second case relating to the delimitation of maritime
zones between two States or more, the Court cannot rely on the
selection of base points by one of the parties. When called upon to
delimit the continental shelf and EEZ, the Court shall use base points in
reference to the physical geography of relevant coasts.
After identifying the base points on the coastlines of the two parties,
the Court will trace the provisional equidistance line based on those
points, which will be identical to the provisional median line. This line
will be confronted with the relevant circumstances in order to achieve
an equitable result.
4.3 The relevant circumstances
When the provisional equidistance line is drawn, the judge considers
whether any factors calling for an adjustment or displacement of this
line to achieve an equitable result.31 These factors, considered as
27 Ibid [131].
28 Ibid [137].
29 These include articles 7, 9, 10, 12 and 15 of the UNCLOS.
30 Fishries case (United Kingdom v Norway) [1952] ICJ Rep 116 [132].
(contd.)
31 This principle was constructed over a long period from 1969 Case Concerning the North Sea Continental
Shelf, Tunisia v Libya (1982), Case Concerning the Gulf of Maine (1984) and Libya v Malta (1985) with the
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relevant circumstances,32 allow the judge to ensure that the provisional
equidistance line that has been drawn based on the geometrical method
from base points identified on the Parties’ coastlines is not, in the light
of the special circumstances, perceived as inequitable. If such was the
case, the judge would adjust the line in order to reach an
equitable solution.33
Regarding applicable rules, the Court observes that the respective
length of coasts can play no role in identifying the equidistance line
which has been provisionally established. Delimitation is a function
which is different from the apportionment of resources or areas.34
There is no principle of proportionality as such which bears on the
initial establishment of the provisional equidistance line.
Where disparities in the lengths of coasts are particularly marked, the
Court may choose to treat that fact of geography as a relevant
circumstance that would require some adjustments to the provisional
equidistance line to be made.
The Court acknowledged that ‘a substantial difference in the lengths
of the parties’ respective coastlines may be a factor to be taken into
consideration in order to adjust or shift the provisional delimitation
line.’35 The Court found that the disparity between the lengths of the
coasts of Jan Mayen and Greenland (approximately 1:9) constituted a
‘‘special circumstance’’ requiring modification of the provisional median
line, by moving it closer to the coast of Jan Mayen, to avoid
inequitable results for both the continental shelf and the fisheries zone.36
In the Case Concerning the Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary
in the Gulf of Maine area (Canada v. United States of America), the
Court examining ‘the equitable criteria that may be taken into
consideration for an international maritime delimitation’ stated:
[T]he fact that to take into account the extent of the respective coasts of the
Parties concerned does not in itself constitute either a criterion serving as a
direct basis for a delimitation, or a method that can be used to implement such
famous statement of principle of the Court: ‘but in any event the baselines as determined by coastal States
are not per se identical with the points chosen on a coast to make it possible to calculate the area of
continental shelf appertaining to that State. In this case, the equitableness of an equidistance line depends on
whether the precaution is taken of eliminating the disproportionate effect of certain ‘‘islets, rocks and minor
coastal projections’’.’ Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v Malta, supra note 13, 48 [64].
32 Cameroon v Nigeria, supra note 23, 441 [288].
33 North Sea Case, supra note 2, 53 [53].
34 As provided for in paragraph 1 of articles 74 and 83 of the UNCLOS.
35 North Sea Continental Shelf, supra note 2, 22 [18].
36 Cameroon v Nigeria, supra note 23, 446 [301].
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delimitation. The Chamber recognizes that this concept is put forward mainly as
a means of checking whether a provisional delimitation established initially on
the basis of other criteria, and by the use of a method which has nothing to do
with that concept, can or cannot be considered satisfactory in relation to certain
geographical features of the specific case, and whether it is reasonable or
otherwise to correct it accordingly. The Chamber’s views on this subject may be
summed up by observing that a maritime delimitation can certainly not be
established by a direct division of the area in dispute proportional to the
respective lengths of the coasts belonging to the parties in the relevant area, but
it is equally certain that a substantial disproportion to the lengths of those coasts
that resulted from a delimitation effected on a different basis would constitute a
circumstance calling for an appropriate correction.37
The question of special circumstances to be taken into consideration
will be dealt with at a later stage by the Court. According to the
Court,38 although there may be no legal limit to the considerations
which States may take account of, this can hardly be true for a court
applying equitable procedures. For a judge, although there is assuredly
no exhaustive list of considerations, it is evident that only those that are
pertinent to the institution of the continental shelf as it has developed
within the law, and to the application of equitable principles to its
delimitation, will qualify for inclusion. Otherwise, the legal concept of
continental shelf could itself be fundamentally changed by the
introduction of considerations strange to its nature.
In fact, the judge will only focus on circumstances relating to the legal
title of the State on disputed maritime areas and which will allow him to
draw a delimitation line that is acceptable and equitable for parties.
After taking into consideration, or not, one or more relevant
circumstances likely to result in the adjustment or shifting of the
provisional delimitation line, the judge will determine and draw what
37 Maritime Delimitation (Greenland and Jan Mayen), supra note 16, the Court observed that ‘it should
however be made clear that taking account of the disparity of coastal lengths does not mean a direct and
mathematical application of the relationship between the length of the coastal front of eastern Greenland
and that of Jan Mayen,’ [69]; In the Case between Libya and Malta, the Court observed: ‘If such a use of
proportionality were right, it is difficult indeed to see what room would be left for any other consideration;
for it would be at once the principle of entitlement to continental shelf rights and also the method of putting
that principle into operation. Its weakness as a basis of argument, however, is that the use of proportionality
as a method in its own right is wanting of support in the practice of States, in the public expression of their
views at (in particular) the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, or in the jurisprudence,’
supra note 13, 45 [58]. In the same case, the Court considered that the difference between the lengths of the
relevant coasts of Malta and Libya (1:8 ratio) was ‘so great as to justify the adjustment of the median line’
and that ‘the degree of such adjustment does not depend upon a mathematical operation and remains to be
examined’; ibid., 50 [68].
38 Case Concerning the Gulf of Maine, supra note 13, 323 [185].
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will become the final delimitation line. All that remains is to verify the
absence of disproportionality for the judge to fully accomplish his task.
4.4 Veriﬁcation of the absence of disproportionality
The judge will now turn to check that the result thus far arrived at, so
far as the envisaged delimitation line is concerned, should not lead to
any significant disproportionality by reference to the respective coastal
lengths and the apportionment of areas that ensue. The ICJ39
recommends the attitude to be adopted. Views contained in the
judgment in the case concerning the delimitation of continental shelf
between the United Kingdom and the French Republic are decisive.40 In
examining the concepts of ‘‘proportionality’’ and ‘‘reasonable evaluation
of natural features,’’ the Tribunal stated:
[P]articular configurations of the coast or individual geographical features may,
under certain conditions, distort the course of the boundary, and thus affect the
attribution of continental shelf to each State, which would otherwise be
indicated by the general configuration of their coasts. The concept of
‘‘proportionality’’ merely expresses the criterion or factor by which it may be
determined whether such a distortion results in an inequitable delimitation of
the continental shelf as between the coastal States concerned … It is
disproportion rather than any general principle of proportionality which is the
relevant criterion or factor … there can never be a question of completely
refashioning nature … it is rather a question of remedying the disproportionality
and inequitable effects produced by particular geographical configurations or
features … Proportionality, therefore is to be used as a criterion or factor
relevant in evaluating the equities of certain geographical situations, not as a
general principle providing an independent source of rights to areas of
continental shelf … proportionality is not in itself a source of title […], but is
rather a criterion for evaluating the equities of certain geographical situations …
The element of proportionality …, its role being rather that of a criterion to
assess the distorting effects of particular geographical features and the extent of
the resulting inequity.41
Checking the absence of disproportionality can only be approximate.
Diverse techniques have in the past been used for assessing coastal
39 Libya v Malta, supra note 13, [48].
40 North Sea Continent Shelf, supra note 2, [98]: ‘…to be taken account of […] the element of a reasonable
degree of proportionality which a delimitation effected according to equitable principles ought to bring
about between the extent of the continental shelf appertaining to the States concerned and the lengths of
their respective coastlines.’
41 Delimitation of the Continental Shelf between the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and
the French Republic, XVIII RIAA 189 and ff., [100, 101, 246, 250]; see also Guinea v. Guinea-Bissau, XIX RIAA
183–184 [94–95].
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lengths, with no clear requirements of international law having been
shown as to whether the real coastline should be followed, or baselines
used, or whether or not coasts relating to internal waters should be
excluded;42 each maritime delimitation case is a ‘‘unicum.’’43
After half a century, maritime delimitation has reached maturity with
its three stages. The first stage, which is the starting point, consists of
drawing a provisional equidistance line. The second stage consists of
ensuring that this line produces an equitable result in which case the
provisional line becomes final.44 However, if the provisional equidis-
tance line does not produce an equitable result, the judge shall adjust or
shift this line based on the relevant circumstances of the case; this is the
third and final stage. This three-stage paradigm will render great service
to the judge in his search for a solution to the maritime delimitation
dispute by offering stability and predictability. We shall now discuss
what is referred to as the ‘‘Grey area’’, the ‘‘Alta mar’’ or the ‘‘Outer
triangle’’.
5 The grey area
The Grey Area45 is an area lying within 200 miles from the coast of one state,
but beyond a maritime boundary with another state. One state is excluded from
42 Black Sea Delimitation, supra note 4, 129 [212].
43 Ibid., [213].
44 [1984] ICJ Rep 290 [81].
45 In the Reply of the United States of America in the Case Concerning the Gulf of Maine, Mr. Colson
explained: ‘The final preliminary issue of geographical significance with which we will deal—and then set
aside—is the matter of the so-called grey area.
[…] Let us turn now to the four reasons we would give to suggest that the grey area is not a matter
that should concern the Chamber in this case. First, the grey area issue has been known for some time and
to our knowledge it has never deterred States from applying a method or methods other than the
equidistance method when it was equitable to do so. Second, the three United Nations Law of the Sea
Conferences have paid no heed to the grey area issue. Third, State practice has not been concerned with this
issue. And, fourth, the Parties have provided a means for dealing with the issue in the Special Agreement.
[…] Figure 109 of our presentation shows two charts—one of the Chile-Peru maritime boundary and the
other of the Peru-Ecuador maritime boundary. […] In the case of the boundary between Chile and Peru, the
grey area created by the boundary measure approximately 7,800 square nautical miles. In the case of the
boundary between Peru and Ecuador it is smaller, measuring about 400 square nautical miles […]. We
would also point out that areas of various sizes exist wordwide, including such negotiated delimitations as
those between Kenya-Tanzania, Colombia-Ecuador, The Gambia-Senegal, Guinea-Bissau-Senegal, the
northern boundary between Portugal and Spain, and Brazil-Urugauy.
Accordingly, the fact that a grey area would exist were the United States line or others through the
Northeast Channel to prevail, is not an unusual circumstance such as to warrant the Chamber’s concern.
The grey area in this case, which would be created by the United States line, is approximately 5700 square
nautical miles,’ ICJ Oral Proceedings, Gulf of Maine Case (Canada/United States of America), vol. VII, 217–220.
Judgment was delivered on 12 October 1984 by the Chamber formed pursuant to the Court order of 20
January 1982. (Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area, Judgment, [1984] ICJ Rep
246).
506 Tafsir Malick Ndiaye
123
exercising jurisdiction in this area because it lies beyond the maritime boundary,
and the other state is excluded from exercising 200-miles-zone jurisdiction
because the grey area on its side of the boundary lies beyond 200 miles from its
coast. The possibility of creating a grey area stems from the fact that there is a
discrepancy between entitlement to the EEZ and the principle applicable to its
delimitation. Entitlement to this zone is solely based on distance from the coast,
but its delimitation between states can be effected on the basis of principles
other than distance from the coast. This results in a line which reaches the outer
limit of the EEZ at a point which is non-equidistant from the coast of the states
concerned. If such a line is applied to limit the maritime zones of both states
involved, a grey area is created.46
The expression ‘‘grey area’’ reveals the uncertainties of its legal status.
The grey area refers to a geographic area that is the focus of overlapping
claims in the EEZ, the continental shelf or the extended continental
shelf of two or more coastal States.47
Consequently, the Grey area poses numerous and complex legal
issues relating to applicable principles for delimitation within and
beyond the 200-nautical-mile limit, the relation between rights and
entitlements to the EEZ and the continental shelf, and in particular, the
possibility or not to create such an area in determining ab initio the
boundary, the EEZ limits or the territorial sea.48
5.1 Entitlement and delimitation
The creation of a grey area in determining boundaries relating to the
EEZ or the territorial sea depends on the existing relation between the
entitlement and the delimitation of maritime areas. Entitlement to these
areas is dependent on the criterion of distance measured from the coast
with the notable exception of historical entitlements.
46 AG Oude Elferink, Does Undisputed Title to a Maritime Zone Always Exclude Its Delimitation: The
Grey Area Issue, 13(2) Intl J Marine and Coastal L (1998) 143–192, 143.
47 See, Shaun Lin and Clive Schofield, Lessons from the Bay of Bengal ITLOS Case: Stepping Offshore for
a ‘‘Deeper’’ Maritime Political Geography, 180(3) The Geographical J (2014) 260–264, 260, where the authors
explain: ‘The ITLOS delimited a maritime boundary with respect to multiple distinct maritime jurisdictional
zones (territorial sea, exclusive economic zone and continental shelf) between Bangladesh and Myanmar (Bay of
Bengal Case). ITLOS did not however, wholly resolve the issues of marine governance that the two states face in
the Bay of Bengal, leaving a number of complex and potentially problematic issues outstanding, including the
unique creation of what was termed a ‘‘grey area’’, the governance arrangements for which are open to debate.’
48 In the Case Concerning the Gulf of Maine, supra note 13, Canada suggests in its Counter-Memorial, 239
that the Grey area could be eliminated by awarding it to the State holding the undisputed title to the said
area, with three possible consequences: ‘(1) A boundary which intersects the 200-nautical-mile limits in the
vicinity of the equidistance line, eliminating or diminishing the grey area; (2) If the single maritime boundary
principle is maintained, one party will have continental shelf jurisdiction in the grey area and neither party
will have fishery zone or EEZ jurisdiction; and (3) If overlapping jurisdictions are accepted, one party will
have continental shelf jurisdiction and the other jurisdiction over the water column.’ The latter was selected
in the jurisprudence of the Bay of Bengal.
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However, delimitation of the EEZ or continental shelf between States
with adjacent or opposite coasts may be carried out based on principles
and criteria other than that of the distance measured from the coast.
In the case concerning delimitation of the maritime boundary in the
Bay of Bengal,49 the ITLOS applied the three-stage paradigm.50 It
determined the method of delimitation, drew the provisional equidis-
tance line and verified the absence of disproportionality. It decided that
the method to be used for delimiting the EEZ and the continental shelf
between Bangladesh and Myanmar was the relevant equidistance/cir-
cumstances method.51
As reiterated by the Tribunal,52 delimitation presupposes an area of
overlapping entitlements. Entitlement and delimitation are two distinct
concepts yet they are interrelated. Parties also recognize the interre-
lationship between entitlement and delimitation. Bangladesh states:
‘The Tribunal must answer this question before it can delimit the shelf:
does either Party have an entitlement to a continental shelf beyond 200
nautical miles?’ Likewise, Myanmar observes that ‘the determination of
the entitlements of both States to a continental shelf beyond 200
nautical miles and their respective extent is a prerequisite for any
delimitation.’
In the present case, the Parties have made claims to the continental
shelf beyond 200 nautical miles which overlap. Part of this area is also
claimed by India. Each Party denies the other’s entitlement to the
continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles. Furthermore, Myanmar
argues that the Tribunal cannot address the issue of the entitlement of
either Bangladesh or Myanmar to a continental shelf beyond 200 nm, as
this is an issue that lies solely within the competence of the Commission
on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS), not of the Tribunal.
The delimitation of the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles
gives rise to a grey area located beyond 200 nautical miles from the
coast of Bangladesh but within 200 nautical miles from the coast of
Myanmar, yet on the Bangladesh side of the delimitation line. The
Parties differ on the status and treatment of the Grey area.
49 Dispute Relating to the Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Bay of Bengal (Bangladesh v Myanmar)
ITLOS, Case no. 16, Judgment of 14 March 2012 [177–340]; Bay of Bengal Maritime Boundary Arbitration
(Bangladesh v India) \http://www.pca-cpa.org/showpage.asp?pag_id=1376[; Maritime Dispute (Peru v
Chile) [2014]\www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/137/17930.pdf[; Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua v
Colombia) [2012] ICJ Rep 624.
50 Ibid [35–60].
51 Bangladesh v Myanmar, ibid [23].
52 Ibid [397–398].
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Myanmar does not dispute that, ‘as a matter of principle, the
delimitation of the continental shelf, including the shelf beyond 200
nautical miles, could fall within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal.’53
Myanmar asserts in its Counter-Memorial that, as a general matter,
the question of the Tribunal’s jurisdiction to delimit the continental
shelf beyond 200 nautical miles should not arise in this case, because the
delimitation line should terminate well before reaching the 200-nautical-
mile limit from the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial
sea is measured.54
Myanmar adds: ‘Even if the Tribunal were to decide that there could
be a single maritime boundary beyond 200 nautical miles (quod non), the
Tribunal would still not have jurisdiction to determine this line because
any judicial pronouncement on these issues might prejudice the rights
of third parties and also those relating to the international seabed
area.’55
Myanmar argues: ‘As long as the outer limit of the continental shelf
has not been established on the basis of the recommendations of the
CLCS, the Tribunal, as a court of law, cannot determine the line of
delimitation on a hypothetical basis without knowing what the outer
limits are.’56 It maintains:
A review of a State’s submission and the making of recommendations by the
Commission on this submission is a necessary prerequisite for any determination
of the outer limits of the continental shelf of a coastal State ‘‘on the basis of these
recommendations’’ under article 76 (8) of UNCLOS and the area of continental
shelf beyond 200 nautical miles to which a State is potentially entitled; this, in
turn, is a necessary precondition to any judicial determination of the division of
areas of overlapping sovereign rights to the natural resources of the continental
shelf beyond 200 nautical miles. To reverse the process, … to adjudicate with
respect to rights the extent of which is unknown, would not only put this
Tribunal at odds with other treaty bodies, but with the entire structure of the
Convention and the system of international ocean governance.57
In support of its position, Myanmar cites the Arbitral Award in the Case
concerning the Delimitation of Maritime Areas between Canada and France (St
Pierre and Miquelon), which states: ‘It is not possible for a tribunal to
reach a decision by assuming hypothetically the eventuality that such




57 Rejoinder of Myanmar [A.17].
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rights will in fact exist.’58 In the view of the arbitral tribunal, any
decision on delimiting the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles
between France and Canada would have been based solely on
hypothetical rights. Myanmar also cites the ICJ judgment in the
Nicaragua v. Honduras case, asserting that the Court there declined to
delimit the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles between
Nicaragua and Honduras because the CLCS had not yet made
recommendations to the two countries concerning their continental
shelf beyond 200 nautical miles. The judgment cited by Myanmar to
this effect states:
[…] It should also be noted in this regard that in no case may the line be
interpreted as extending more than 200 nautical miles from the baselines from
which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured; any claim of continental
shelf rights beyond 200 miles must be in accordance with Article 76 of UNCLOS
and reviewed by the CLCS established thereunder.59
Myanmar elaborated on its position during the oral proceedings, stating,
inter alia, that in principle it did not question the Tribunal’s jurisdiction.
The two Parties did indeed accept the jurisdiction of the Tribunal on the
same terms, in accordance with the provisions of article 287, paragraph
1, of the Convention, for the ‘settlement of [the] dispute … relating to
the delimitation of [the] maritime boundary between the two countries
in the Bay of Bengal.’ According to Myanmar, the only problem
concerned the possibility that the Tribunal might exercise such
jurisdiction to decide on the delimitation of the continental shelf
beyond 200 nautical miles.
Myanmar further contended that, if the Tribunal ‘nevertheless were
to consider the Application admissible on this point—quod non—’, it
‘could not but defer judgment on this aspect of the matter until the
Parties, in accordance with Article 76 of the Convention, have taken a
position on the recommendations of the Commission concerning the
existence of entitlements of the two Parties to the continental shelf
beyond 200 [nautical miles] and, if such entitlements exist, on their …
extension’ towards the outer limits of the continental shelf of the two
countries.60
Bangladesh is of the view that the Convention expressly empowers
the Tribunal to adjudicate disputes between States arising under articles
58 [1992] XXXI RIAA 293 [81].
59 Nicaragua v Honduras, supra note 19, 659, 759 [319].
60 ITLOS/PV.11/11, 9, 18–23.
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76 and 83, in regard to the delimitation of the continental shelf. As the
Convention draws no distinction between jurisdiction over the inner
part of the continental shelf, i.e., that part within 200 nautical miles, and
the part further away, delimitation of the entire continental shelf is,
according to Bangladesh, covered by article 83, and the Tribunal plainly
has jurisdiction to carry out delimitation beyond 200 nautical miles.61
Responding to Myanmar’s argument that ‘in any event, the question
of delimiting the shelf beyond 200 [nautical miles] does not arise
because the delimitation line terminates well before reaching the 200
[nautical mile] limit,’ Bangladesh states that ‘Myanmar’s argument that
Bangladesh has no continental shelf beyond 200 [nautical miles] is based
instead on the proposition that once the area within 200 [nautical miles]
is delimited, the terminus of Bangladesh’s shelf falls short of the 200
nautical mile limit.’62 Bangladesh contends ‘[t]his can only be a valid
argument if the Tribunal first accepts Myanmar’s arguments in favour
of an equidistance line within 200 nautical miles. Such an outcome
would require the Tribunal to disregard entirely the relevant circum-
stances relied upon by Bangladesh’.63
With reference to Myanmar’s argument regarding the rights of third
parties, Bangladesh contends that a potential overlapping claim of a
third State cannot deprive the Tribunal of jurisdiction to delimit the
maritime boundary between two States that are subject to the
jurisdiction of the Tribunal, because third States are not bound by
the Tribunal’s judgment and their rights are unaffected by it.
Bangladesh points out that so far as third States are concerned, a
delimitation judgment by the Tribunal is merely res inter alios acta and
that this assurance is provided in article 33, paragraph 2, of the Statute
of the Tribunal.64
Bangladesh also observes that Myanmar’s contention ‘with regard to
the international seabed area disregards its own submission to the CLCS,
which makes clear that the outer limits of the continental shelf vis-à-vis
the international seabed are far removed from the maritime boundary
with Bangladesh.’65 Bangladesh notes a certain inconsistency in Myan-
mar’s position on this subject, observing that Myanmar ‘accepts with
respect to the potential areas of overlap with India that even if [the
61 Memorial Submitted by Bangladesh, in, Bangladesh v Myanmar, supra note 49, [4.23].
62 Reply of Bangladesh [4.30].
63 Reply of Bangladesh [4.40].
64 Memorial Submitted by Bangladesh [4.35].
65 Reply of Bangladesh [4.17].
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Tribunal] cannot fix a tripoint between three States, it can indicate the
‘‘general direction for the final part of the maritime boundary between
Myanmar and Bangladesh,’’ and that doing so would be ‘‘in accordance
with the well-established practise’’ of international courts and tribunals.’66
Among Bangladesh’s conclusions summarizing its position on the
issue of third-party rights and the jurisdiction of the Tribunal are the
following:
2. The delimitation by the Tribunal of a maritime boundary in the continental
shelf beyond 200 [nautical miles] does not prejudice the rights of third parties. In
the same way that international courts and tribunals have consistently exercised
jurisdiction where the rights of third States are involved, ITLOS may exercise
jurisdiction, even if the rights of the international community to the
international seabed were involved, which in this case they are not.
3. With respect to the area of shelf where the claims of Bangladesh and
Myanmar overlap with those of India, the Tribunal need only determine which
of the two Parties in the present proceeding has the better claim, and effect a
delimitation that is only binding on Bangladesh and Myanmar. Such a
delimitation as between the two Parties to this proceeding would not be
binding on India.67
In respect of the role of the CLCS, Bangladesh states:
[T]here is no conflict between the roles of ITLOS and the Commission in
regard to the continental shelf. To the contrary, the roles are complementary.
ITLOS has jurisdiction to delimit boundaries within the outer continental
shelf; the Commission makes recommendations as to the delineation of the
shelf’s outer limits with the international seabed, provided there are no
disputed claims between adjacent or opposite States. Indeed, the Commission
may not make any recommendations on the outer limits until such dispute is
resolved (by ITLOS or another judicial or arbitral body, or by agreement
between the parties)—unless the parties give their consent that the Commis-
sion review their submissions. In the present case, the Commission is
precluded from acting due to the Parties’ disputed claims in the outer
continental shelf and the refusal by at least one of them (Bangladesh) to
consent to the Commission’s actions.68
Bangladesh contends:
[I]f Myanmar’s argument were accepted, ITLOS would have to wait for the
CLCS to act and the CLCS would have to wait for ITLOS to act. The
resulting catch-22 would mean that whenever parties are in dispute in
regard to the continental shelf beyond 200 [nautical miles], the Compulsory
66 Reply of Bangladesh [4.17].
67 Reply of Bangladesh [4.91].
68 Memorial Submitted by Bangladesh, [4.28 and 4.29].
512 Tafsir Malick Ndiaye
123
Procedures Entailing Binding Decisions under Part XV, Section 3 of
UNCLOS would have no practical application. In effect, the very object
and purpose of the UNCLOS dispute settlement procedures would be
negated. Myanmar’s position opens a jurisdictional black hole into which all
disputes concerning maritime boundaries in the outer continental shelf
would forever disappear.69
Summarizing its position, Bangladesh concludes in the Reply: ‘In
portraying CLCS recommendations as a prerequisite to exercise of
jurisdiction by this Tribunal, Myanmar sets forth a circular argument
that would make the exercise of ITLOS jurisdiction with respect to the
continental shelf beyond 200 [nautical miles] impossible. This is not
consistent with Part XV of the UNCLOS or with Article 78.’70 It must be
recalled that the jurisdiction of the Tribunal depends in all instances on
the prior consent of the parties and that no sovereign State can be party
to a case before an international court unless it has consented thereto. It
is this consent to bring a dispute before the Tribunal that determines the
Tribunal’s jurisdiction over the dispute. However, the dispute and the
applications [in French, demandes] should not be confused. Article 21 of
the Statute of the Tribunal provides: ‘The jurisdiction of the Tribunal
comprises all disputes and all applications [demands] submitted to it in
accordance with this Convention and all matters specifically provided
for in any other agreement which confers jurisdiction on the
Tribunal.’71
This means that the Tribunal, in performing its judicial task, may
choose the terms under which it will respond to the Parties’
submissions. The Tribunal is therefore free to consider and decide the
question of delimiting the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles
separately. Myanmar’s jurisdictional objection in respect of the
delimitation of the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles is
justified by the fact that Myanmar as Respondent accepted the
jurisdiction of the Tribunal. Indeed, paragraph 12 of the minutes of
69 Reply of Bangladesh [4.7].
70 Reply of Bangladesh [3.91 (1)].
71 The ICJ has defined a submission to be the ‘precise and direct statement of a claim [demande]’
(Fisheries Judgment, [1951] ICJ Rep 116, 126). According to the Court, submissions may not be presented in
interrogative form (Haya de la Torre, Judgment, [1951] ICJ Rep 71). And the Court considers that it has
jurisdiction to interpret them, which allows it, where it deems necessary, to refrain from responding to them
(Monetary Gold Removed from Rome in 1943, Preliminary [1954] ICJ Rep 19, 28). The Court wrote: The Italian
Government contends that the Court has no jurisdiction to adjudicate upon these Submissions of the United
Kingdom. The Court cannot consider itself as lacking jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the validity, withdrawal
or cancellation of an application which has been submitted to it: to adjudicate upon such questions with a
view to deciding upon the effect to be given to the Application falls within the purview of its judicial task.
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the consultations with the President of the Tribunal clearly states:
‘During the course of the consultations, the delegation of Myanmar
informed the President of the intention of Myanmar to file preliminary
objections in case. In respect of this matter, a letter from the Agent of
Myanmar dated 25 January 2010 was handed over the Registrar.’ Those
preliminary objections concern the delimitation of the continental shelf
beyond 200 nautical miles between the two Parties.
The allocation of rights within the grey area is a very complex issue.
In the Bangladesh v Myanmar case, the delimitation line follows a
geodetic line starting at an azimuth of 215 until it reaches a point
situated at 200 nautical miles from the baselines from which the breadth
of the territorial sea of Bangladesh is measured.
In the case between Bangladesh and India, the delimitation line of the
Arbitral Tribunal also creates a grey area beyond 200 nautical miles from
the coasts of Bangladesh but within the 200 nautical miles of India. As
Bangladesh does not have rights over the EEZ, the dividing line beyond
200 miles only delimits overlapping claims to the continental shelf.
Consequently, Bangladesh has sovereign rights to explore the continental
shelf and exploit ‘mineral and other non-living resources of the seabed and
subsoil together with living organisms belonging to sedentary species’
east of the dividing line in the grey area. India, for its part, has sovereign
rights over the EEZ regarding the superjacent waters.
The Arbitral Tribunal leaves it to the two States to determine the
practical arrangements for the realization of their respective rights in the
grey area. This judgment is singularly similar to that of the ITLOS in the
case between Bangladesh and Myanmar.
Given the nature of the dividing line, Bangladesh alone exercises
sovereign rights on the continental shelf of the two grey areas created
by ITLOS and the Arbitral Tribunal (Annex VII). Therefore, neither
India nor Myanmar can exploit the seabed and sub-soil in grey areas.72
These decisions of the two jurisdictions are debatable. The Indian judge,
for instance, in the case between Bangladesh and India strongly objects
to these decisions. He explains: ‘Sovereign rights of a coastal State over
the water column and the seabed and its subsoil are considered as two
indispensable and inseparable parts of the coastal State’s rights in the
72 Bangladesh v India, supra note 49, [505]; Bangladesh v Myanmar, supra note 49 [474] where ITLOS
decided that ‘… in the area beyond Bangladesh’s exclusive economic zone that is within the limits of
Myanmar’s exclusive economic zone, the maritime boundary delimits the Parties’ rights with respect to the
seabed and subsoil of the continental shelf but does not otherwise limit Myanmar’s rights with respect to the
exclusive economic zone, notably those with respect to the superjacent waters.’
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EEZ’.73 Anticipating the difficulties likely to arise in the management
and sharing of maritime species, Dr. Rao indicates: ‘As a matter of
policy, international courts and tribunals should avoid delimiting
boundaries in a way that leaves room for potential conflicts between the
parties … The grey area also has the potential to exacerbate bilateral
relations and pose avoidable security problem.’74 In dealing with the
case, D. A. Anderson observed rightly:75
In light of the Bangladesh/Myanmar case, as well as the North Sea Continental
Shelf case, the decision to depart from the provisional equidistance line to take
account of the concavity of the relevant coasts was supported by precedent and
thus predictable. But the (majority) decision suffers from a lack of transparency
concerning the construction of the delimitation line.
The Tribunal’s decision to extend the delimitation of the continental
shelf beyond 200 nautical miles followed that of ITLOS in the same Bay
of Bengal. The legislative history of the Third United Nations
Conference on the Law of the Sea shows that the Bay of Bengal is a
special case, a factor that was not, however, brought out in terms of the
award. In delimitation cases concerning other parts of the world,
different considerations may apply. The existence of two grey areas in
the Bay of Bengal may complicate relations over fisheries issues in the
future. In some boundary negotiations, the parties have agreed upon a
‘‘joint area’’ for a particular purpose and at the same time have defined
the applicable regime for its management. The two grey areas appear at
present to lack such measures of agreement and cooperation.
5.2 Jurisprudence in the delimitation of the continental shelf beyond
200 nautical miles between the parties: should a precedent have
been created?
Delimitation is determined by agreement or by adjudication by a court
or tribunal. The outer limits of the continental shelf are established by
the coastal State on the basis of recommendations by the Commission
and are ‘‘final and binding’’. The recommendations of the Commission
are submitted in writing to the coastal State which made the submission
and to the Secretary-General of the United Nations.76 For this reason,
73 Ibid Dissenting opinion of Dr. Rao [31].
74 Ibid [35–37].
75 DA Anderson, Bay of Bengal Maritime Boundary (Bangladesh v India), 109 Am J Intl L (2015)
146–154,153.
76 Annex II, article 6, [3] of the Convention.
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article 7 of Annex II provides: ‘Coastal States shall establish the outer
limits of the continental shelf in conformity with the provisions of
article 76, paragraph 8, and in accordance with the appropriate national
procedures.’ The thrust of these rules is to establish by implication that
any delimitation of the continental shelf, or any delineation of its outer
limits beyond 200 nautical miles, effected unilaterally by one State
regardless of the views of the other State or States concerned, or
established otherwise than under article 76, paragraph 8, is in
international law not opposable to those States.77
‘The delimitation of sea areas has always an international aspect; it cannot be
dependent merely upon the will of the coastal State as expressed in its municipal
law. Although it is true that the act of delimitation is necessarily a unilateral act,
because only the coastal State is competent to undertake it, the validity of the
delimitation with regard to other States depends upon international law.’78
Under the circumstances of the case, can the Tribunal delimit the
continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles between Bangladesh and
Myanmar? Specifically, can it do so even before the Parties’ claims to
the continental shelf have been confirmed on the basis of the
recommendations by the CLCS referred to in article76, paragraph 8?
Each Party disputes the other’s entitlement to continental shelf area
beyond 200 nautical miles. The circumstances:
(a) Treaty obligations (article 76 and Annex II of the Convention).
Paragraph 1 of article 76 of the Convention defines the continental
shelf and establishes two criteria. The first is the distance criterion
for those States whose continental margin does not extend more
than 200 nautical miles from the baselines. In this case, the outer
limit of the juridical continental shelf merges with the outer limit of
the EEZ. The second criterion is a geomorphological one for those
States whose continental margin extends more than 200 miles from
the baselines. In this case, the coastal State must show the CLCS that
the natural prolongation of its land mass extends more than 200
nautical miles. For purposes of this determination, there apply
(i) two formulae determining the outer edge of the continental
margin and (ii) constraints limiting the expansion of States. The
outer limit of the juridical continental shelf can be established by the
77 Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area, supra note 13, 246, 292 [87].
78 Fisheries case (UK v Norway) [1951] ICJ Rep 116, 132.
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combined application, in accordance with precise rules, of the lines
resulting from the formulae and constraints. Scientific data must be
gathered at sea to produce the information needed to apply the
formulae. The coastal State establishes the outer limits of the con-
tinental shelf on the basis of the recommendations made by the
CLCS (article 76, para. 8, of the Convention and Annex II of
the Convention). The Secretary-General of the United Nations gives
due publicity to these limits. Article 3, paragraph 1, of Annex II to
the Convention describes the Commission’s functions as follows:
1. The functions of the Commission shall be:
(a) to consider the data and other material submitted by coastal States
concerning the outer limits of the continental shelf in areas where those limits
extend beyond 200 nautical miles, and to make recommendations in accordance
with article 76 and the Statement of Understanding adopted on 29 August 1980
by the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea;
(b) to provide scientific and technical advice, if requested by the coastal State
concerned during the preparation of the data referred to in subparagraph (a).
This means that the authority to examine lies with the Commission if
the information furnished to it proves that the conditions laid down in
article 76 for purposes of establishing the outer limits of the continental
shelf are satisfied by the coastal State. Under the terms of the
Convention, the power to assess the scientific and technical data
submitted by the coastal State is vested exclusively in the Commission.
The Tribunal complicated its task by delimiting the continental shelf
beyond 200 nautical miles even though the Commission has not
pronounced upon the outer limits of each Party’s continental shelf.
(b) Suspension of a submission by the CLCS
‘In cases where a land or maritime dispute exists, the Commission shall not
consider and qualify a submission made by any of the States concerned in the
dispute. However, the Commission may consider one or more submissions in
the areas under dispute with prior consent given by all States that are parties to
such a dispute’ (Annex I, para. 5(a), of the Rules of Procedure of the
Commission).
In accordance with this, the Commission stated on the subject of the
submission made by Myanmar pursuant to article 76 on 16 December
2008:
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noting that there had been no developments to indicate that consent existed on
the part of all States concerned allowing the consideration of the submission
notwithstanding the existence of a dispute in the region, the Commission
decided to further defer the establishment of a subcommission for the
consideration of the submission made by Myanmar. It was also decided that,
since the submission remained next in line for consideration as queued in the
order in which it was received, the Commission would revisit the situation at
the time of establishment of its next subcommission.
The Commission reiterated this decision at its twenty-seventh session (7
March–21 April 2011). Considering the positions of the Parties as
described above, the Tribunal will first address the main point in
dispute, namely whether or not they have any entitlement to the
continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles. In this regard, the Tribunal
will first examine the Parties’ positions in regard to their respective
entitlements; it will analyse the meaning of ‘‘natural prolongation’’ and
its interrelation with that of continental margin. The Tribunal will then
ascertain whether it has jurisdiction in the present case to determine the
entitlements of the Parties to the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical
miles. Finally, the Tribunal will determine whether there is overlap
between any entitlements the Parties may have to the continental shelf
beyond 200 nautical miles. On the basis of these determinations, the
Tribunal will take a decision on the delimitation of the continental shelf
of the Parties beyond 200 nautical miles.79
While both Parties make claims to the continental shelf beyond 200
nautical miles, each disputes the other’s claim. Thus, according to them,
there are no overlapping claims over the continental shelf beyond 200
nautical miles. It follows either that the question of delimitation does
not arise or that the delimitation between the Parties must be effected
so as to leave the entire continental shelf area beyond 200 nautical miles
to one Party alone.
Bangladesh submits that pursuant to article 76 of the UNCLOS, it has
an entitlement to the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles. It
further submits that Myanmar enjoys no such entitlement because its
land territory has no natural prolongation into the Bay of Bengal
beyond 200 nautical miles. Therefore, according to Bangladesh, there is
no overlapping continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles between the
Parties, and it alone is entitled to the continental shelf claimed by both
of them. Bangladesh thus submits that any boundary in this area must
79 Bangladesh v Myanmar, supra note 49, 96 [401].
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lie no further seaward from Myanmar’s coast than the 200 nautical mile
‘‘juridical shelf’’ provided for in article 76.80
In respect of its own entitlement to the continental shelf beyond 200
nautical miles, Bangladesh asserts that ‘the outer continental shelf
claimed by Bangladesh is the natural prolongation of Bangladesh’s land
territory by virtue of the uninterrupted seabed geology and geomor-
phology, including specifically the extensive sedimentary rock deposited
by the Ganges–Brahmaputra river system.’81 To prove this, Bangladesh
provided the Tribunal with scientific evidence to show that there is a
geological and geomorphological continuity between the Bangladesh
land mass and the Bay of Bengal. In addition, Bangladesh submits that
its entitlement to the outer continental shelf, the limits of which have
been established by the so-called Gardiner formula based on sediment
thickness, extends well beyond 200 nautical miles.
In respect of Myanmar’s entitlement, Bangladesh claims that
Myanmar is not entitled to a continental shelf beyond 200 nautical
miles because it cannot meet the physical test of natural prolongation in
article 76, paragraph 1, which requires evidence of a geological
character connecting the seabed and subsoil directly to the land
territory. According to Bangladesh, there is overwhelming and
unchallenged evidence of a ‘‘fundamental discontinuity’’ between the
landmass of Myanmar and the seabed beyond 200 nautical miles (RB,
para. 4.62). Bangladesh contends that the tectonic plate boundary
between the Indian and Burma Plates is manifestly ‘a marked disruption
or discontinuance of the seabed’ that serves as ‘an indisputable indication
of the limits of two separate continental shelves, or two separate natural
prolongations.’82
In its note verbale of 23 July 2009 to the Secretary-General of the
United Nations, Bangladesh stated that the areas claimed by Myanmar
in its submission to the Commission as part of its putative continental
shelf were in fact the natural prolongation of Bangladesh and hence
Myanmar’s claim was disputed by Bangladesh (MB, vol. III, Annex 21).
In its submission of 25 February 2011 to the Commission, Bangladesh
reiterated this position, stating that it ‘disputes the claim by Myanmar to
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of the natural prolongation of Bangladesh.’83 In summing up,
Bangladesh states in its Memorial:
That by reason of the significant geological discontinuity which divides the
Burma plate from the Indian plate, Myanmar is not entitled to a continental shelf
in any of the areas beyond 200 [nautical miles]. That Bangladesh is entitled to
claim sovereign rights over all of the bilateral shelf area beyond 200 [nautical
miles] claimed by Bangladesh and Myanmar …; That, vis-à-vis Myanmar only,
Bangladesh is entitled to claim sovereign rights over the trilateral shelf area
claimed by Bangladesh, Myanmar and India … (MB, paragraph 7.43).
Myanmar rejects Bangladesh’s contention that Myanmar has no
entitlement to a continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles. While
Myanmar does not contradict Bangladesh’s evidence from a scientific
point of view, it emphasizes that the existence of a geological
discontinuity in front of the coast of Myanmar is simply irrelevant to
the case. According to Myanmar, the entitlement of a coastal State to a
continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles is not dependent on any
‘‘test of natural geological prolongation’’. What determines such
entitlement is the physical extent of the continental margin, that is to
say its outer edge, to be identified in accordance with article 76,
paragraph 4, of the Convention.84
Myanmar asserts that it identified the outer edge of its continental
margin by reference to the Gardiner formula, which is embodied in
article 76, paragraph 4(a)(i). The Gardiner line thus identified is well
beyond 200 nautical miles, and, consequently, so is the outer edge of
Myanmar’s continental margin. Therefore, Myanmar is entitled to a
continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles in the present case. It has
accordingly submitted the particulars of the outer limits of its
continental shelf to the Commission pursuant to article 76, paragraph
8, of the Convention.85
In a note verbale dated 31 March 2011 to the Secretary-General of the
United Nations, Myanmar stated: ‘Bangladesh has no continental shelf
extending beyond 200 [nautical miles] measured from base lines
established in accordance with the international law of the sea’ and
‘Bangladesh’s right over a continental shelf does not extend either to the
83 Executive Summary, appearing in RB, vol. III, Annex R3 [5.9].
84 ITLOS/PV.11/11, 20, line 28.
85 CMM [A.2].
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limit of 200 [nautical miles] measured from lawfully established base
lines, or, a fortiori, beyond this limit.’86
Myanmar argues that Bangladesh has no continental shelf beyond 200
nautical miles because the delimitation of the continental shelf between
Bangladesh and Myanmar stops well before reaching the 200-nautical-
mile limit measured from the baselines of both States (CMM, para.
5.160). In these circumstances, the question of the delimitation of the
continental shelf beyond this limit is moot and does not need to be
considered further by the Tribunal.87
Determining the entitlements of the two States to the continental
shelf beyond 200 nautical miles and their respective extent is a
prerequisite for any delimitation.
This consists of ‘draw[ing] the exact line or lines where the extension
in space of the sovereign powers and rights of [one State concerned]
meets those of [the other].’88 The intimate link between States’
entitlement to a maritime area and the delimitation of a maritime area
between neighbouring States is ‘‘self-evident’’.89 It is apparent that ‘le
titre commande la délimitation, la délimitation est fille du titre’
(‘entitlement determines delimitation, delimitation issues from entitle-
ment’ [translation by the Registry]).90
On the subject of determining the Parties’ entitlements, the Tribunal
explains91 that not every coast generates entitlement to a continental
shelf extending beyond nautical miles. The Commission in some
instances has based its recommendations on its view that an entire area
or part of an area included in a coastal State’s submission comprises part
of the deep ocean floor. Myanmar does not deny that the continental
shelf of Bangladesh, if not affected by the delimitation within 200
nautical miles, would extend beyond that distance. Bangladesh does not
deny that there is a continental margin off Myanmar’s coast but argues
from its interpretation of article 76 of the Convention that this margin
has no natural prolongation beyond 50 nautical miles off that coast. The
Tribunal says that the problem lies in the Parties’ disagreement as to
what constitutes the continental margin (para. 442 of the Judgment). It
86 RM, Appendix, 198.
87 CMM 165.
88 Aegean Sea Continental Shelf [1978] ICJ Rep 3, 35 [85].
89 Continental Shelf (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v Malta), supra note 13, 13, 30 [27].
90 P Weil, Vers une conception territorialiste de la délimitation maritime, in, Mélanges Michel Virally (ed)
Le droit international au service de la paix de la justice et du développemen (Paris, Pedone 1991), 501–511, 511.
91 Bangladesh v Myanmar, supra note 49, [200].
The judge, maritime delimitation and the grey areas 521
123
notes that the Bay of Bengal presents a unique situation and that its sea
floor is covered by a thick layer of sediments 14 to 22 kilometres deep.
The Tribunal states that, given the presence of these sedimentary rocks,
both Parties included in their submissions to the Commission data
indicating that their entitlement to the continental margin extending
beyond 200 nautical miles was based to a great extent on article 76,
paragraph 4(a)(i), of the Convention.92
The entitlement to be ascertained cannot but be tied to the definition
itself of the continental shelf. An exercise in maritime delimitation
consists of applying the natural sciences to ascertain the extent of the
natural prolongation under the sea of each of the two States and of
making a finding on—not awarding—the extent of the submarine
basement nature has placed before each of the two States.
In past decades, it was the concept of natural prolongation of a State’s
land territory that made it possible to determine how far seaward the
State’s rights to the seabed extended. Today, it is the criterion of distance
that performs this function for the continental shelf, the EEZ and the
territorial sea. Let us recall that every coastal State has the right to a
continental shelf, which is the natural prolongation of its territory. This
right can be limited in five different ways: (1) to 200 nautical miles where
the outer edge of the continental margin lies within that distance; (2) by
the outer edge of the continental margin; (3) to a distance of 350 nautical
miles where the outer edge of the continental margin lies at a greater
distance than that; (4) by the rights and entitlements of third States; and (5)
by the rights and entitlements of the international community repre-
sented by the International Seabed Authority (ISA). It would have been
good to have specific data on the continental shelf of Bangladesh and
Myanmar beyond 200 nautical miles. The distance criterion is linked to
the law relating to a State’s legal entitlement to the continental shelf. As
the ICJ has said,93 the law applicable to the dispute, i.e., to claims relating
to continental shelves located less than 200 miles from the coasts of the
States in question, is based not on geological or geomorphological
criteria, but on a criterion of distance from the coast or, to use the
traditional term, on the principle of adjacency as measured by distance.
The problem here lies in the fact that this criterion does not apply to
the continental shelf beyond 200 miles. The consequences of the
development of continental shelf law can be seen with regard to both
92 Ibid [445].
93 Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v Malta, supra note 13, 13, 46 [61].
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verification of entitlement and delimitation as between rival claims. On
the basis of the law now applicable, namely the distance criterion, has it
been proved that Bangladesh and Myanmar hold valid entitlements to
the seabed areas they claim? What is the impact of considerations of
distance on the delimiting itself, which must both fix limits on the
States’ maritime projections seaward and delimit these various areas
between the two States? It has to be kept in mind in making this
assessment that the delimitation must achieve an equitable result by
applying equitable principles to the relevant circumstances. The
adjudicator must decide ‘‘on the basis of law’’.94
To this end, the International Court of Justice has established the status of
equitable principles. It explains that the judicial decisions are at one in
holding that the delimitation of a continental shelf boundary must be
effected by the application of equitable principles in all the relevant
circumstances in order to achieve an equitable result. This approach ‘is not
entirely satisfactory because it employs the term equitable to characterize
both the result to be achieved and the means to be applied to reach this
result.’95 It is, however, the goal—the equitable result—and not the means
used to achieve it, which must be the primary element in this duality of
characterization. ‘Equity as a legal concept is a direct emanation of the idea
of justice. The Court whose task is by definition to administer justice is
bound to apply it.’96 A distinction must however be made between applying
equitable principles and giving a decision ex aequo et bono, because ‘it is not a
question of applying equity simply as a matter of abstract justice, but of
applying a rule of law which itself requires the application of equitable prin-
ciples, in accordance with the ideas which have always underlain the
development of the legal régime of the continental shelf in this field.’97
Thus the justice of which equity is an emanation is not abstract justice
but justice according to the rule of law, which is to say that its application
should display consistency and a degree of predictability. Even though it
looks with particularity to the peculiar circumstances of an instant case, it
also looks beyond it to principles of more general application.98
Equitable principles therefore take on a normative character.
94 Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area, supra note 13, 246, 278 [59].
95 Tunisia v Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, supra note 9, 18, 59 [70].
96 Ibid 60 [71].
97 North Sea Continental Shelf, supra note 2, 3, 47 [85].
98 Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v Malta, supra note 13, 13, 39 [45] and B Kunoy, The Delimitation of an
Indicative Area of Overlapping Entitlement to the Outer Continental Shelf, British Yrbk Intl L (2012) 61–81,
63, 81.
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The present Judgment is that it does not succeed in determining
Bangladesh’s and Myanmar’s precise entitlements to the continental
shelf beyond 200 nautical miles. Nor does it succeed in establishing the
extent of those entitlements. On the issue of its jurisdiction to decide
the Parties’ entitlements, the Tribunal points out the need to make a
distinction between the notion of entitlement to the continental shelf
beyond 200 nautical miles and that of the outer limits of the continental
shelf. It notes that ‘article 83 of the Convention addresses the
delimitation of the continental shelf between States with opposite or
adjacent coasts without any limitation as to area. It contains no
reference to the limits set forth in article 76, paragraph 1, of the
Convention. Article 83 applies equally to the delimitation of the
continental shelf both within and beyond 200 nm.’ The Tribunal
explains that a coastal State’s entitlement to the continental shelf exists
by the sole fact that the basis for it is present; it does not require the
establishment of outer limits. Article 77 of the Convention is cited in
this connection.99
This illustrates a fundamental difference to be observed between land
delimitation—which upholds vestiges of the colonial era—and maritime
delimitation. Unlike the former, the latter does not involve identifying the
better title, hence the legally dispositive one; it involves resolving the
difficulties created by the coexistence of two entitlements of equal legal
value. ‘While suum cuique tribuere is the objective in land delimitation,
maritime delimitation is destined to cut back the entitlement of each. One
involves recognition, enshrinement; the other reduction, sacrifice, cutting
back. This explains the difference in the role played by effectivity in land
and maritime delimitations. Occupation, effective exercise of State
sovereignty, acts of sovereignty: all elements which help to establish the
better, hence legally prevailing, title in land delimitation cases but which
have no relevance in maritime delimitation.’100
Unable to determine the Parties’ exact entitlements to the continental
shelf beyond 200 nautical miles, or to establish their extent so as to
ascertain whether those entitlements are concurrent, overlapping or
intertwined, the Tribunal takes another tack. It states:
The scientific data and analyses presented in this case, which have not been
contested, do not establish that Myanmar’s continental shelf is limited to 200 nm
99 Bangladesh v Myanmar, supra note 49, [361].
100 P Weil, Délimitation maritime et délimitation terrestre, International Law at a Time of Perplexity: Essays in
Honour of Shabtai Rosenne (Dordrecht, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1989), 1021–1026, 1024.
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under article 76 of the Convention, and instead indicate the opposite’’101; [and]
[t]he Tribunal accordingly concludes that both Bangladesh and Myanmar have
entitlements to a continental shelf extending beyond 200 nm. The submissions
of Bangladesh and Myanmar to the Commission clearly indicate that their
entitlements overlap in the area in dispute in this case.102
In respect of the Area, the Tribunal adds its observation that, as is
evident from the Parties’ submissions to the Commission, the
continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles that is the subject of
delimitation here is situated far from the Area (para. 368 of the
Judgment). It is indeed true that the Commission has neither confirmed
nor invalidated the scientific information in the submissions made to it,
since it has suspended its consideration of them on account of the
dispute that is the object of the present case (on the subject of the
decision to defer consideration of the respective submissions of
Myanmar and Bangladesh).103 The Parties dispute each other’s claims
to the continental shelf. While each makes a claim to continental shelf
area beyond 200 nautical miles, each challenges the other’s claim.
Accordingly, there are no overlapping claims to the continental shelf
beyond 200 nautical miles. Instead, each claim is exclusive of the other.
From the Parties’ point of view, the question of delimitation does not
arise and it may be that the delimitation should be effected so as to
leave the entire continental shelf area beyond 200 miles to one Party or
the other. As a result, we are reduced to conjecture. And, by drawing
the line it envisages, is the Tribunal not prejudicing the rights of the
international community? Beyond doubt, the right process was to have
recourse first to the Commission.
It must be kept in mind that judges find entitlements; under no
circumstances may they grant them. Owing to the nature of the judicial
function and the nature of entitlements, it is all the more imperative
that courts rely on existing law, however uncertain may be the
principles or rules deriving from the requirement of an equitable solu-
tion. The Tribunal pretends to base its decision on principles of law,
but, for lack of sufficiently precise substantive rules founded on general
international law, it is reduced to ruling by the exercise of discretion.
101 Bangladesh v Myanmar, supra note 49, [448].
102 Ibid [449].
103 See the Statement by the Chairman of the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf on the
Progress of Work in the Commission, CLCS/64, 1 October 2009, 10 [40], and the Statement by the
Chairman of the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf on the Progress of Work in the
Commission, CLCS/72, (16 September 2011), 7 [22].
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This approach rebounds on the Tribunal’s chosen method of
delimitation—equidistance/relevant circumstances—insofar as the ele-
ments of the delimitation exercise become inoperative, that is to say
inapplicable, for three reasons:
First, it is by juxtaposing titles which are concurrent, overlapping or
intertwined throughout their full extent that an idea of the relevant area
can be derived, and this in turn makes it possible to ensure that there is
no disproportion. This process plays an important role in the
delimitation operation by assessing the relationship between the length
of the coasts of the States concerned and the extent of maritime area
accruing to them. This means that it is difficult to produce from rough
guesses the explicit result expected of delimitation, which must achieve
an equitable result. Indeed, it has by now become unclear whether this
is a dispute concerning attribution of one territory or a dispute
concerning delimitation of two territories, since the relevant area is non-
existent because indeterminate.
‘In the view of the Tribunal, the delimitation method to be employed
in the present case for the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles
should not differ from that within 200 nm. Accordingly, the equidis-
tance/relevant circumstances method continues to apply for the
delimitation of the continental shelf beyond 200 nm. This method is
rooted in the recognition that sovereignty over the land territory is the
basis for the sovereign rights and jurisdiction of the coastal State with
respect to both the exclusive economic zone and the continental shelf.
This should be distinguished from the question of the object and extent
of those rights, be it the nature of the areas to which those rights apply
or the maximum seaward limits specified in articles 57 and 76 of the
Convention. The Tribunal notes in this respect that this method can,
and does in this case, permit resolution also beyond 200 nm of the
problem of the cut-off effect that can be created by an equidistance line
where the coast of one party is markedly concave.’104
This method involves three well-defined stages. The first consists of
plotting the provisional equidistance line. At this stage, the judge pays
no heed to any relevant circumstances and the line is drawn in
accordance with strictly geometric criteria on the basis of objective data.
The course of the final line must produce an equitable solution (articles
74 and 83 of the Convention). This is why in the second stage the judge
considers whether there are any factors calling for an adjustment or
104 Bangladesh v Myanmar, supra note 49, [449].
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displacement of the provisional equidistance line to achieve an
equitable result. Finally, in the third stage the judge must verify that
the line does not lead to an inequitable result by reason of any marked
disproportion between the ratio of the respective coastal lengths and the
ratio between the relevant maritime areas of the two States by reference
to the delimitation line.
Next, under these conditions identifying the relevant circumstances
becomes a tricky exercise characterized by uncertainty in respect of
the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles. The role of
proportionality, the conduct of the Parties, socio-economic elements,
the general geographical setting, and the geology and geomorphology
could furnish factual information for the adjudicator to take into
consideration in drawing an equitable line. The approach changed
somewhat and an attempt was made to re-establish order by assessing
the weight to be accorded to relevant circumstances in any particular
delimitation. According to the ICJ: ‘In fact, there is no legal limit to
the considerations which States may take account of for the purpose
of making sure that they apply equitable procedures, and more often
than not it is the balancing-up of all such considerations that will
produce this result rather than reliance on one to the exclusion of all
others.
The problem of the relative weight to be accorded to different
considerations naturally varies with the circumstances of the case.’105
But it is not so where a judicial or arbitral body applies equitable pro-
cedures. For such a body, although there is assuredly no exhaustive list
of considerations, it is evident that only ‘those that are pertinent to the
institution of the continental shelf as it has developed within the law,
and to the application of equitable principles to its delimitation, will
qualify for inclusion. Otherwise, the legal concept of continental shelf
could itself be fundamentally changed by the introduction of consid-
erations strange to its nature.’106 In the case at hand can a convincing
link be established between the relevant circumstances cited by just one
Party and the adversarial continental shelf claims asserted by
Bangladesh and Myanmar?
Specifically, does the equidistance line duly take account of the
relevant circumstances, i.e., the cut-off effect it produces, the concavity
of the Bangladesh coast and the Bengal depositional system? Do these
105 North Sea Continental Shelf, supra note 2, 3, 50 [93].
106 Continental Shelf (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya/Malta), supra note 13, 13, 40 [48].
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factors call for an adjustment or shifting of the equidistance line beyond
200 nautical miles in order to arrive at an equitable result? Did the
Tribunal ensure that the decided delimitation line did not lead to an
inequitable result by reason of a marked disproportion between the
ratio of the respective coastal lengths and the ratio of the relevant
maritime areas? What are the relevant maritime areas attributed by the
delimitation line to Bangladesh and Myanmar beyond 200 nautical
miles?
Bangladesh contends that the relevant circumstances in the delim-
itation of the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles include the
geology and geomorphology of the seabed and subsoil, because
entitlement beyond 200 nautical miles depends entirely on natural
prolongation while within 200 nautical miles it is based on distance
from the coast.107 According to Bangladesh, its entitlement to the
continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles ‘‘rests firmly’’ on the
geological and geomorphological continuity between its land territory
and the entire seabed of the Bay of Bengal. Bangladesh states that
Myanmar ‘at best enjoys only geomorphological continuity between its
own landmass and the outer continental shelf.’108 In Bangladesh’s view,
therefore, ‘an equitable delimitation consistent with article 83 must
necessarily take full account of the fact that Bangladesh has the most
natural prolongation into the Bay of Bengal, and that Myanmar has little
or no natural prolongation beyond 200’ nautical miles.109
Another relevant circumstance cited by Bangladesh is ‘the continuing
effect of Bangladesh’s concave coast and the cut-off effect generated by
Myanmar’s equidistance line, or by any other version of an equidistance
line.’ According to Bangladesh, ‘[t]he farther an equidistance or even a
modified equidistance line extends from a concave coast, the more it
cuts across that coast, continually narrowing the wedge of sea in front
of it.’110
Given its position that Bangladesh’s continental shelf does not extend
beyond 200 nautical miles, Myanmar did not present arguments
regarding the existence of relevant circumstances relating to the
delimitation of the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles. In this
connection the Tribunal observes that Myanmar stated that there are no
107 ITLOS/PV.11/6, 24, line 34.
108 ITLOS/PV.11/6, 26, lines 2–3.
109 ITLOS/PV.11/6, 26, lines 16–19.
110 ITLOS/PV.11/6, 26, lines 35–37.
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relevant circumstances requiring a deflection of the provisional
equidistance line in the context of the delimitation of the continental
shelf within 200 nautical miles.
Finally, a question may be raised on the nature of the line dividing
the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles. The Tribunal has
decided that the maritime boundary more than 200 nautical miles from
Bangladesh continues along the geodetic line starting from point 11 at
an azimuth of 215 as identified in operative paragraph 5, until it
reaches the area where the rights of third States may be affected.111 The
Tribunal has decided that, in view of the geographic circumstances in
the present case (concavity and cut-off effect, St Martin’s Island), the
delimitation line must be deflected at the point where it begins to cut
off the seaward projection of the Bangladesh coast and that the direction
of the adjustment is to be determined in the light of this circumstance.
In this regard, we must confess to great surprise at paragraphs 235, 236
and 237 of the Judgment, since the Tribunal has opted to follow the
equidistance/relevant circumstances method. It is only when the
equidistance method leads to an inequitable and unreasonable result
that recourse to other methods is justified. Thus, it is an inherent
contradiction, a logical paradox, to change approach.
If this delimitation operation is justifiable for the continental shelf
within 200 nautical miles and the exclusive economic zone, it is wholly
inappropriate for the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles
because the Parties’ entitlements remain undefined: unless there are
overlapping, equal entitlements to a given area, there is hardly any call
for maritime delimitation. Good sense required terminating the
delimitation line at the 200-nautical-mile limit, not beyond.
Under the circumstances of the present case, the Tribunal should
have sought a preliminary ruling in order to settle this last part of the
dispute. It should have made an Order of referral to that end. There has
been no recourse to the referral-for-preliminary-ruling mechanism in
international law. It is a concept of European Union law applicable in
the courts of the European Union Member States.
The preliminary-ruling procedure affords national courts the possi-
bility of seeking the views of the Court of Justice of the European Union
on the interpretation or validity of Community law in the context of
litigation before them. The procedure aims at ensuring legal certainty
through the uniform application of Community law throughout the
111 Paragraph of the operative part of the Judgment, Bangladesh v Myanmar, supra note 49.
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European Union. The procedure is now provided for in articles 256 and
267 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU).
The Tribunal alone can do this. It is necessary to recall here the
different views expressed by international courts and tribunals on the
subject of delimitation beyond 200 nautical miles. In the Arbitration
between Barbados and the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago, relating to the
delimitation of the exclusive economic zone and the continental shelf
between them, the Arbitral Tribunal said ‘As will become apparent,
however, the single maritime boundary which the Tribunal has
determined is such that, as between Barbados and Trinidad and
Tobago, there is no single maritime boundary beyond 200 nm. The
problems posed by the relationship in that maritime area of CS and EEZ
rights are accordingly problems with which the Tribunal has no need to
deal. The Tribunal therefore takes no position on the substance of the
problem posed by the argument advanced by Trinidad and Tobago.’112
In the case concerning Territorial and Maritime Dispute between Nicaragua
and Honduras in the Caribbean Sea, the ICJ said:
The Court may accordingly, without specifying a precise endpoint, delimit the
maritime boundary and state that it extends beyond the 82nd meridian without
affecting third-State rights. It should also be noted in this regard that in no case
may the line be interpreted as extending more than 200 nautical miles from the
baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured; any claim of
continental shelf rights beyond 200 miles must be in accordance with Article 76
of UNCLOS and reviewed by the Commission on the Limits of the Continental
Shelf established thereunder.113
Further, the arbitral award in the case concerning Delimitation of
Maritime Areas between Canada and France (St Pierre and Miquelon) reads:
‘It is not possible for a tribunal to reach a decision by assuming
hypothetically the eventuality that such rights will in fact exist’.114
International courts and tribunals in these various cases have endeav-
oured to apply positive law without seeking to create precedent.
The ITLOS, the CLCS, the ISA and the Meeting of States Parties to
the Convention are organs set up by the Convention, and each must
assume a given role assigned to it under the Convention, that of
guardian and authoritative interpreter being for the Tribunal. This
creates a limitation—an important one for the Tribunal—on the
112 XXVII RIAA 147, 242 [368] (Decision of 11 April 2006).
113 Supra note 13, 659, 759 [319].
114 Decision of 10 June 1992, 31 ILM (1992) 1145, 1172 [81] (English translation); see also XXI RIAA 265,
293 [81] (French version).
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exercise of its jurisdiction, for not only does the Convention specifically
assign to the Commission the task of:
consider[ing] the data and other material submitted by coastal States concerning
the outer limits of the continental shelf in areas where those limits extend
beyond 200 nautical miles, and … mak[ing] recommendations in accordance
with article 76 and the Statement of Understanding adopted on 29 August 1980
by the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea.
In this regard, the Commission enjoys the exclusive, discretionary
authority to carry out the tasks entrusted to it and the Tribunal must
take account of this in the exercise of its jurisdiction in the present case.
For this reason, the Tribunal should have referred the matter to the
Commission at this stage in the proceedings, without there being any
need for one of the Parties to request it to do so, since the Tribunal
should have considered itself unable to dispense justice in the
circumstances of the case. It is for the Tribunal to judge whether to
make the referral.
If the dispute could be settled solely on the basis of international law,
if the question were substantively identical to one already resolved by
the international jurisprudence, or if applying the delimitation rules and
principles could lead to an equitable result and be in accordance with
article 76 of the Convention, a referral would have been pointless.
However, in the three cases in which the question has arisen—St Pierre
and Miquelon arbitration, Arbitration between Barbados and the Republic of
Trinidad and Tobago,115 and Territorial and Maritime Dispute between
Nicaragua and Honduras in the Caribbean Sea116—the judicial and arbitral
bodies exercised caution and confined themselves to recalling the law in
force.
There was a real need to request a preliminary ruling by the
Commission so that the validity of the entitlements claimed by the
Parties to the dispute before the Tribunal could be assessed. This would
have enabled us to dispense justice to Bangladesh and Myanmar and to
settle this dispute once and for all. This would also have paved the way
for other international fora (the ICJ and arbitral tribunals) to deal with
this difficult issue: this was the judicious course.
115 Delimitation of Maritime Areas between Canada and France (St Pierre & Miquelon) [1992] XXI RIAA [78 &
7] (in French); 31 ILM (1992) [78 & 79] (in English). Barbados v Republic of Trinidad and Tobago [2006]
XXVII RIAA [213].
116 Case concerning the Arbitral Award made by the King of Spain on 23 December 1906 (Nicaragua v Honduras)
[1960] ICJ Rep 192 [319].
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For this purpose, the Tribunal should have immediately notified the
President of the Meeting of States Parties and the Chairman of the
Commission with a view to lifting the suspension, dating from 11 May
2011, of consideration of Myanmar’s submission. It should be kept in
mind that Myanmar is first in the queue and the examination of its
submission would have sufficed for the Tribunal in the exercise of its
jurisdiction because the data and information furnished by Bangladesh
are uncontested.
The Tribunal should have empowered the President and the two
judges ad hoc to act so as to ensure equality of the Parties in the
process. A memorandum of understanding with the Commission and a
specific timetable could then have been agreed to. The Order of referral
and the memorandum of understanding could have been annexed to
the Judgment delivered by the Tribunal on 14 March 2012.
The Commission could have been requested to make its recommen-
dations within one year: this would have initiated the second phase of
this case. As the Tribunal is at liberty in the performance of its judicial
role to define the manner in which it chooses to respond to the parties’
submissions, The Tribunal is therefore free to consider and decide the
question of delimiting the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles
separately.
Disputes of this kind may well proliferate in a world in which
territorial concerns play a leading role. This was an opportune occasion
to establish a procedural precedent that could prove very useful to
international courts and tribunals called upon to exercise jurisdiction in
these areas.
The system put in place under the Convention corresponds to the
notion that some subject matters call for a lighter procedure, one with
recourse to experts not lawyers and one in which factual determinations
undoubtedly play a more important role than ‘‘legal’’ considerations in
the strict sense; this is because scientific questions are answered by
science, not law.
Thus, Annex II of the Convention establishes the CLCS, which is
tasked with making recommendations to coastal States on matters
related to establishing the outer limits of their continental shelf when it
extends more than 200 nautical miles from the baselines.
By laying down precise criteria for the determination of the limits of
the continental shelf, article 76 dispels the uncertainties having arisen
under the1958 Convention, which, among other things, based the
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definition of the continental shelf on exploitability, thereby paving the
way to runaway extensions.
Application of the scientific criteria set out in article 76 could not be
left solely to the discretion of the coastal State, which remains
empowered to determine the course of its boundaries since it
establishes the outer edge of the continental margin and delineates
the outer limits of its continental shelf.117
The Commission was established to provide an independent,
objective analysis of the elements of a State’s claim in respect of the
outer limits of its continental shelf. The Commission has to contribute
to determining the definitive course of the outer limits of the
continental shelf. It must also act as ethical safeguard by preventing
overblown claims.
Maritime delimitation is founded on the notion that the coastal
projections of two neighbouring States, each measuring a certain
distance from the coast, overlap or are superimposed. Where there are
not equal, concurrent entitlements to a given area, there is no call for
maritime delimitation. The problem in the present case is that the
claimed entitlements are founded more on presumptions than proof,
hence the need for recourse to the Commission.
The Tribunal is the guardian and authoritative interpreter of the
Convention and is duty-bound to be painstaking in protecting and
preserving it.
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